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ABSTRACT

In the late 1970s, the average per capita income in Iraq was
$4,0001 and the nation had $40 billion in monetary reserves.2 Then
Saddam Hussein seized power. When he was deposed twentythree years later, the average per capita income in Iraq was $1503
and the nation had liabilities in excess of $125 billion. 4 In 1966,
Ferdinand Marcos became president of the Philippines. In that
year, the state's debt was less than $1 billion.5 Twenty years later,
he and his wife were forced to flee. In their wake, they left a legacy
of more than $28 billion in foreign debt.6 A similar story took place
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1 Joshua Craze, Freeing Iraq from Debt, WADI, May 6, 2003, available at
http://www.wadinet.de/news/iraq/nw1654_debt.htm.
2 Ali Allawi, Why Iraq's Debt Deal Makes Sense, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005,
available at http://www.euromoney.com/Article/1000386/Title.html.
3 See Craze, supra note 1 (describing the debt left behind after Saddam
Hussein fell from power).
4 See Allawi, supra note 2.
5 Arnold Padilla, Taxpayers to Pay Marcos Debt Until 2025, BULATLAT, Sept. 19,
2004, available at http://www.bulatlat.com/news/4-33/4-33-marcosdebt.html.
6 Id.

947

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

948

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 29:4

in Zaire under Mobuto Sese Seko. He seized power in 1965 and
maintained control for thirty-two years. When he died in 1997, he
7
left his people with debt of over $12 billion.
In each of these historical instances, the funds were nominally
borrowed on behalf of the dictators' respective states, but
unsurprisingly, each of them looted huge sums for their own
wallets and personal agendas. Whether these rulers personally
embezzled the money or used it to buy dangerous weapons, the
debt incurred attached to the country itself, never to the deposed
ruler or his or her family. According to international law, neither
the removal from power of these dictators, nor their deaths, does
anything to alleviate the debt obligations burdening the states they
once dominated. In other words, a dictator may fall, but the
financial obligations stemming from his or her personal largesse or
blood lust remain to strangle newly freed nations in their
proverbial cribs.
Take Saddam Hussein's Iraq as an example. In the name of his
country, he incurred massive quantities of debt for palaces,
personal luxuries, and weapons to suppress his people. After he
was deposed, the suppressed became the debtors; the people of
Iraq were actually responsible for paying back the money he
borrowed to keep them under his thumb. He had literally bought
bullets to suppress the people who would end up paying for them.
Such debts are known by an illustrative term: odious debt. For
over a century, international legal scholars have been attempting to
develop a practical and coherent doctrine that would, in certain
instances, erase these obligations after a dictator has fallen. The
scholarly motivations behind these efforts vary widely - some
believe it's a moral question; others believe it is an economic one but the central substantive concern for any proposal aimed at
addressing this problem must involve the balancing of burdens
between creditors and debtors.
Unfortunately, writing off the debt burdens of developing
countries that have recently emerged from a dictator's control is
not a simple matter. Of course, if one thinks that creditors should
be responsible for how the funds they lend are employed, then one

7 See Michael Kremer & Seema Jayachandran, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
POLICY BRIEF # 103: ODious DEBT, availableat http://www.brookings.edu/-/
media/files/rc/ papers/ 2002/O7globaleconomicskremer/ pblO3.pdf (explaining
how dictators have accumulated foreign debt while appropriating funds for their
personal use).
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may argue that they accept the additional risk that accompanies
negligent lending. In other words, if funds are used in a manner
hostile to the titular debt holder, then the burden of loss should fall
on the creditor. Such a simplistic approach, however, may create
A policy must be carefully
more problems than answers.
or capital flows to countries
articulated,
constructed and clearly
throughout the developing world are likely to either cease or
become exorbitantly expensive. Lenders would demand a great
premium for the added uncertainty that would exist in a world of
flexible debt obligations. A legal doctrine that permits debtors to
avoid repaying debt merely because they previously lived under a
"bad" ruler would be counterproductive; all over the world,
borrowers looking for money would suddenly find themselves
lacking access to capital markets.
In fact- and some recent scholarship has confused this pointone must remember that the word "odious" in the phrase "odious
debt" modifies the debt, not the ruler. If it were used to define the
ruler, what benchmarks would be used? How "bad" is bad
enough? What would happen when a sufficiently "bad" ruler
actually employed a portion of the borrowed funds for appropriate
purposes like roads or hospitals -would the debt still be written
off merely because the originator was a dictator?
This linguistic complication -whether to target bad actors or
bad expenditures -has resulted in some confusing analysis of the
underlying issue. Yet its resolution is critical to any coherent
solution. For that reason, this Comment proposes an ex ante
labeling mechanism 8 and an ex post judicial body. The labeling
function would put lenders on notice that they are contracting with
unsavory actors, but the institution of a judicial mechanism after a
regime changes hands would allow lenders to defend how their
Essentially, my proposal avoids the
funds were employed.
definitional dilemma by clarifying when the two questions are
relevant: a creditor may lend to a dictator officially labeled as a bad
actor, but the creditor is then responsible for monitoring how its
funds are employed.
See generally Seema Jayachandran, Michael Kremer & Jonathan Shafter,
Applying the Odious Debts Doctrine While Preserving Legitimate Lending 3
(June 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard University Center for
International Development, available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/bluesky/
papers/jayachandran odiousdebt_0609.pdf) (providing an example of the
labeling concept, first introduced by Seema Jayachandran, Michael Kremer, and
Jonathan Shafter).
8
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This proposal treats the definitional and political questions in a
manner that should be acceptable both to those who want to target
dictators and to those who are concerned about the "odious debt
dilemma" but do not want to risk choking off capital flows to the
developing world. Ideally, it would establish a legal regime that
imposes on creditors incentives for extreme diligence without
severely curtailing those flows of capital.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the 108 years since the concept of odious debt was first
directly advanced during the negotiations ending the SpanishAmerican War, the only constant has been a striking inability to
establish a coherent and practical application of the doctrine. As
mentioned previously, some argue it is a moral imperative. 9
Others assert that its basis is financial: if developing countries are
forced to pay an egregious debt overhang in order to play in global
markets, the cycle of economic failure will continue.1 0 In the
shadow of the Iraq war, and as the dangers of failed states have
become abundantly clear, the latter argument has gained increased
credibility as part of a larger national and economic security
platform.1 1
Yet the most prominent scholarly articulation of the doctrine the Sackian model-fails to reconcile these divergent motives. In
stark contrast to the objectives of those who believe the doctrine is
a moral imperative, Sack's model places the burden of proving the
"odiousness" of a loan on the newly freed regime. The model also
fails to provide a mechanism protecting new regimes that are
attempting to repudiate some of their debt from being punished in
capital markets. The result is a very real concern among borrower
states that any debt repudiation will make it both very difficult and
very expensive to gain access to capital markets. In most instances,
a newly freed state is going to be so desperate for credit that the
last thing it is going to do is risk angering lenders by pursuing a

9 Id. at 1.
10 See generally Soren Ambrose, Social Movements and the Politics of Debt
Cancellation, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 267 (2005) (arguing that governments should use
political capital to repudiate debt in response to the IMF's Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism proposition).
11 See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, FORWARD 4 (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter The National Security
Strategy] (linking impoverishment in nations such as Afghanistan with terrorism).
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write-off. For this reason, odious debt claims are rarely asserted,
and accordingly, the conceptual challenges of the doctrine had not
been given a great deal of attention in years. That changed
dramatically with the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
For obvious reasons, the new Iraqi government immediately
garnered international financial support.
Irrespective of the
controversy surrounding the invasion, the United States
government was going to ensure Iraq's access to global capital
markets. Furthermore, the "odiousness" of Saddam Hussein was
never in question, and the idea of the newly freed Iraqis having to
retroactively pay for the very weapons that were so widely known
to have been used against them generated a great deal of
international attention. Nevertheless, a practical and coherent
solution remained elusive.
A historical understanding of previous failures must precede
any new proposed framework, lest the new proposals repeat the
previous miscalculations. Since the concerns of burden-balancing
between creditor and debtor have plagued this doctrine for over a
century, any proposal on the subject requires an in-depth
examination of the previous incarnations of the odious debt
doctrine and their respective shortcomings.
These will be
discussed in Section 1 of this Comment. Section 2 discusses the
legal theory that makes an odious debt doctrine both necessary and
complicated: the doctrine of state succession. The doctrine of state
succession - which is customary international law - demands that
new regimes inherit the debts of their predecessors. Any odious
debt exception to the doctrine will therefore require a strong legal
foundation. Sections 3 and 4 of this Comment discuss the early
applications and ambiguous history that surrounds the doctrine.
Section 5 discusses why the most commonly advanced version of
the doctrine to date has been unworkable. Section 6 discusses the
recent surge in scholarship on the matter and explains its
contemporary relevance.
Section 7 details this Comment's
proposal for dealing with the dilemma of odious debt in the global
economy.
1.1. A New Approach to An Old Idea
Some scholars have argued that the entire concept of odious
debt ought to be scrapped in favor of more traditional judicial
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remedies. 12 This Comment's proposal, however, asserts that a
workable doctrine of odious debt is plausible, and it rests on a shift
in the burden of proof from the debtor to the creditor and the
establishment of an international organization with limited judicial
responsibilities and doctrine borrowed from United States
corporate law.
The proposed solution adopts some key concepts from a
provocative article that likewise suggested establishing a
framework for the development of an ex ante labeling regime,
13 It
designed to identify governments that are "odious-prone."
goes a step further, however, by suggesting that this new
organization be endowed with an ex post judicial function.
Labeling regimes "odious-prone" is merely necessary; it is not
sufficient. A workable doctrine also demands this shift in the ex
post burden of proof from the borrower to the creditor who lent to
a regime with the label affixed to it.
Nevertheless, it is critically important that lending to regimes
with the dreaded label attached does not establish an unrebuttable
presumption of ex post "guilt" once the government in question is
overthrown. Otherwise capital flows to these countries, which are
often in dire need of resources, would cease or, at least, become
extremely expensive. Creditors, as the party best-positioned to
insist on transparency, must therefore be given the opportunity to
monitor the use of their loans and to advance an ex post argument,
based on evidence gathered during intensive monitoring, that the
funds were actually employed appropriately by the noxious
regime.
Finally, for this system to be effective, there must be a credible
guarantee that sovereigns who repudiate the debt of their odious
predecessors will not lose their access to capital markets as
punishment.
If -the sanctioning body is composed of
representatives from nations that control access to a sufficient
percentage of the world's capital markets, such as the members of
the G8, a guarantee would be a straightforward matter 4 The G8
12 See Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma Of
Odious Debts, 56 DuKE L.J. 1201, 1204 (2007) (exploring how private domestic law
can be used to protect nations whose leaders have incurred odious debt).
13 See Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 19.
14 Id. at 23. Jayachandran et al. refer to the G7 since Russia, the nation that
joined the G7 to make it the G8, does not participate in some financial and
economic meetings. That said, I would include them in my regime since Russia is,
technically, a member of the group now, and I think it would enhance legitimacy
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members constitute enough of the world's capital markets that a
guarantee of access from their members would prevent this threat
of punishment from extinguishing odious debt claims.
Granted, money is fungible, and an odious regime could
employ borrowed funds for acceptable purposes, while using
alternate funding for odious endeavors. This is a legitimate
critique of the entire concept, but a well-crafted version of the
odious debt doctrine, while still imperfect, could nevertheless
make it much more difficult for these regimes to borrow. Forcing
an odious regime to reallocate funds to support its bad habits
would likely make it that much harder for it to achieve whatever
reprehensible goals it is pursuing. Any doctrine that makes it
harder for these regimes to get money, in turn, will make it harder
for them to maintain power. Furthermore, this proposal would
ensure that at least borrowed funds are used to support proper
social functions -a vast improvement over the current system.
1.2. The Proposal in Brief
The regime I propose adopts some concepts that have been
advanced by recent scholarship, and it rejects or modifies others.
This Comment supports the idea of a new institution designed
specifically to address the matter of odious debt. I argue, however,
that this institution should be tasked with two discrete functions,
one that is straightforward and another that is complicated, but
rare. The first task involves ex ante labeling, and the second
requires an ex post judicial function. Since one of the most
consistent and persuasive criticisms of the doctrine has been its
impracticality, I suggest that the jurisprudence of this proposed
institution should be modeled on a pre-existing body of law,
thereby greatly simplifying its implementation. One of the key
elements of crafting a creditor-driven policy requires a shift in the
burden of proof from the claimant to the creditor. Fortuitously, the
entire fairness standard in Delaware corporate law does something
quite similar, and its jurisprudence could prove instructive to this
new regime.
Without making too much of this comparison, the logic of the
entire fairness standard is similar to what is required in this
and avoid insulting a Russian economy that is growing rapidly. If, however,
Russia presented a roadblock to implementation, its participation is not
necessarily a prerequisite, but it is a preference. See G8 Information Center,
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what-isg8.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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solution to the odious debt problem. Critically, it shifts the burden
of proving the entire fairness of a particular transaction to the
controlling shareholders. Similarly, if a creditor lends to a nation
that has been labeled odious-prone, the creditor would essentially
be accepting a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. In this case, the
shareholders are citizen taxpayers.
Furthermore, when a creditor lends to a state on the odiousprone list, much like a corporation engaging in a self-interested
transaction, the creditor loses the presumption that would be
analogous to the business judgment rule. Instead, lending to a
labeled state should create something akin to a duty of care- hence
the need for ex ante labeling. Naturally, this presumption favors
the plaintiff -in this instance, the claimant state. The defendant the creditor-must prove that the transaction (the loan) was
entirelyfair.
If implemented, the regime would target the least-cost avoider,
the creditor, by making it presumptively liable when lending to an
odious-labeled regime. In order to ensure the maintenance of
lending to the developing world, however, the proposed
institution's ex post adjudication function would allow the creditor
to make a case based on logic similar to the entire fairness
standard. In other words, it is a rebuttable presumption, which
can be overcome with evidence that the creditor fulfilled its duty of
care. There are certainly limits to the analogy -the duty here falls
on lenders, not directors, for instance-but it could provide the
proposed debt tribunal with a practical model upon which to build
a workable understanding of lender obligations in this distinct
context.
Additionally, unlike some other recent reform proposals,
implementation of this system would not be prohibitively
expensive. My proposal would shift the most costly functionmonitoring-from the newly created official institution to the
relevant private actor, the creditor. The creditor would only be
able to fulfill its duty of care through intensive scrutiny of its loan
after it has been disbursed. Failing to scrutinize how a creditor's
funds are employed would essentially extinguish its claim for
repayment. In other words, the loan agreement would specify and
certify how the loans were to be employed. The creditor would
then be charged with enforcing the terms of the agreement, and if
it failed, it could lose its claim on the lent money.
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1.3. Ripe to Overcome Past Challenges?
In its traditional form, the odious debt doctrine always faced
significant practical challenges that limited its efficacy.
For
example, when can it accurately be said that a leader governs
without the consent of his or her people? Who makes that
determination in the international legal context? If it is somehow
determined that the leader does govern without consent, can an
entire loan be repudiated even if part of it actually benefits
oppressed citizens? These are some of the definitional questions
that wreaked such havoc with any real application of the doctrine
that it was frequently ignored during the latter half of the
twentieth century.
In the wake of the invasion of Iraq, however, the concept has
gained renewed relevance. Nevertheless, its impact as a legal rule
is still limited by the fundamental disagreement over its
application. Much has recently been written in a scholarly effort to
translate the odious debt concept into a workable legal doctrine.
This Comment outlines the limitations of the historical version of
the doctrine, and it elaborates and advances some of the reform
proposals that have been made in recent years. Undoubtedly, it
leaves much room for improvement. Rather than being an
endpoint, this Comment is intended to be another contribution,
albeit with some new suggestions, to the growing literature
devoted to a serious economic and legal dilemma that often
plagues the unfortunate survivors of history's worst dictators.
2.

A HISTORICAL CONCEPT?

2.1. Debt Overhang & the Doctrineof State Succession
In first considering the problem of odious debt, a reasonable
preliminary question would be: why bother repaying debt that
was clearly used for odious purposes. Ignoring for a moment the
dual problems of actually establishing how a loan was used and
the reputational concerns accompanying debt repudiation, there is
an important principle of international law that underlies the
tendency towards repayment. Any discussion of odious debt must
begin with an analysis of the doctrine of state succession.
Under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a
corporation that can no longer finance its debt burden is able to
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renegotiate its financial obligations to its creditors.

5

If the

subsequent reorganization is insufficient and the company still
fails, the remaining debt will die with the corporation. 16 Given
these rules, lenders are typically zealous about assessing the risk
profiles of would-be borrowers before a dollar ever changes hands.
Corporate law also extends protection to a company's
shareholders. They are shielded from responsibility for corporate
debt by the principle of limited liability, which holds that debts of
a corporation do not pass involuntarily to individual shareholders
beyond the respective investment they have already made, which
17
they naturally lose.
Sovereign debt, however, operates very differently. In regard
to national debt, state practice demands that the "continuation of
the international legal personality of a predecessor state generally
obligates the continuing state to the full amount of the predecessor
state's national debt." 8 In other words, if Saddam Hussein
borrows in the name of Iraq-whether the funds are borrowed
from a sovereign, a multilateral institution, or a private lender -the
debt attaches to the nation even after Hussein's regime has fallen. 9
This is a reflection of the time-honored doctrine of state succession.
The principle holds that when one regime "replace[s] ...another in
the responsibility for [conducting] the international relations of a
territory" 20 the "legal personality," which includes debt
obligations, remains intact, even though control passes from one
regime to another. 21 Continuing the analogy with U.S. corporate
15 See Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1207 (describing corporate debt
treatment); see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 108 (9th ed. 2004)

(laying out the characteristics of a public corporation).
16 See Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1207 (contrasting corporate debts and
sovereign debts, as sovereigns cannot rely on death, bankruptcy, or dissolution to
be relieved of "imprudent borrowing").
17 See KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 15, at 145 (describing limited liability).
18 Paul Williams & Jennifer Harris, State Succession to Debts and Assets: The
Modern Law and Policy, 42 HARV. J. INT'L L. 355, 362 (2001).
19 See Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1205-06 (stating that "a government
automatically inherits the debts of its predecessor governments regardless of how
dissimilar the forms of government may be").
20 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts art. 2(1)(a)), opened for signature Apr. 8, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 306
(1983) [hereinafter 1983 Vienna Convention]. See generally D.P. O'CONNELL, THE
LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION (1956) (discussing general principles of the doctrine of
state succession).
21 See generally Williams & Harris, supra note 18 (discussing how creditor
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law, it is imperative to recognize that the doctrine of state
succession and the principle of limited liability are fundamentally
in opposition to each other. Unlike corporate law, under state
succession, Iraq's shareholders (citizens) remain liable for the
entire debt of the corporation (Hussein's government) when it fails.
Granted, the purposes of these two doctrines are different. Limited
liability is intended to induce investment, and the rules of state
succession are intended to maintain the integrity of sovereign
lending in a world that is constantly witnessing the emergence of
new regimes. Nevertheless, limiting the liability of citizens that
have no hand in the selection or behavior of their leaders- in other
words, in the case of dictators or elected leaders that become
dictators -would make sense.
Perhaps unfortunately for those who advocate a sovereign debt
restructuring mechanism ("SDRM"), the rules governing state
succession to debt obligations originate in practice and evolving
customary international law, 22 a fact that suggests the rule is not
easily changed. The 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of State Property, Archives, and Debt tried to
codify these principles but, since the convention is not in force, the
doctrine of state succession is derived from practice and opinio
juris. 23 In particular, the period of decolonization after World War
II saw significant contribution to the customary international law
on this subject. 24 Since "the end of colonization resulted in the
emergence of approximately one hundred new states," 25 the
doctrine of state succession was intensely relevant, and it became a
solidly established legal principle due to consistent "state
practice." 26 Certainly, lenders are more inclined to take risks
secure in the knowledge that debt obligations survive changes in
government. By the relatively recent collapses of the Soviet Union
and the former Yugoslavia, it was clear that when a regime died its

states effect the allocation of debts and assets when states dissolve, break away, or
are restructured).
22 Id. at 356.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Kevin H. Anderson, International Law and State Succession: A Solution to the
Iraqi Debt Crisis?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 401, 401 (2005) (citing Hubert Beemelmans,
State Succession in InternationalLaw: Remarks on Recent Theory and State Praxis, 15
B.U. INT'L L.J. 71, 72 (1997)).
26 Id. at 411.
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remained
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ineradicable."

generally

"congenital,

adhesive,

and

2.2. Odious Debt Theory
"When these new citizens.., appear on the scene, they will
inherit many things: a territory, a history, and the infrastructure of
society. They may also inherit a stock of unpaid debts.., that
public international law requires them to assume as their own
obligations." 28 Since the principle of state succession binds
successor generations, it is not surprising that these suddenly
empowered citizens sometimes begin to wonder whether or not
there are any exceptions to this "congenital" 29 rule governing state
succession. One of the very few theoretical exceptions to it is the
doctrine of odious debt. Though the doctrine's legal foundation is
far from stable, its appeal to newly established governments is
obvious.
As an example, let us again consider the paradigmatic case of
Iraq. Before Hussein's rise, Iraq was an increasingly productive
30
nation with a relatively substantial per capita income level.
When Hussein seized power, however, he squandered billions in
state funds on military equipment and on personal luxuries, all
without the consent of the Iraqi people. 31 In fact, a substantial
portion of that money was spent attacking and repressing the very
people who would eventually be left holding the bill.32 In such an
egregious situation, the principle of odious debt, theoretically at
least, protects Iraqi citizens from having to repay "debt [that] has
been imposed upon the people.., without their consent... [and]
has not been incurred for [their] benefit." 33 The theory also relies

27

Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1208 [citing Geoffrey Watson, The Law of

State Succession, in CONTEMPORARY

PRACTICE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

115-27

(Ellen Schaffer and Randall J. Snyder eds. 1997)] [internal emphasis omitted].
28

Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1208 [citing

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 209 (1987)].

Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1208.
See Anderson, supra note 25, at 432 for an estimate of Iraq's per capita
income level at four thousand dollars in 1980.
29
30

31

Id. at 433.

See id. at 437 (stating that Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against
his own citizens).
33 On Public Debts, in 1 JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 97, at 358-59 (1906). See also Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY
L.J. 923,923 (2004) (quoting On PublicDebts).
32
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on the fact that "creditors, from the beginning, took the chances
of ...investment" 34 with a dictator. Thus, according to the odious
debt concept, claims to enforce debts are "inapplicable, legally and
35
morally."
Idealistic proclamations aside, the legal foundation of the
doctrine has actually rested on shaky ground since it was first
invoked over a century ago.
Rather than being customary
international law, early applications of the odious debt doctrine
were based on parochial notions of justice, and it was often directly
in conflict with both positive law and judicial opinion on the
matter of state succession. 36 Over time, however, the concept
generated enough agreement that, if proven, an odious debt was
37
theoretically unenforceable according to international law.
Essentially, it was a speculative "carve[] out.., to the generally
accepted rule of repayment" 38 under the doctrine of state
succession. A coherent legal standard for establishing whether or
not a debt was "odious," however, remained elusive.
3.

EARLY APPLICATIONS

3.1. The Spanish-American War
In 1898, the United States and Spain commenced the Paris
Conference to deal with some of the still smoldering issues of the
Spanish-American War of the same year. 39 One of the major
elements of the negotiations involved loans to Cuba. Since the
loans in question were granted after 1880-when Cuba became a
40
de facto colony of Spain-they were governed by Spanish law.
During the period of Spanish control, the loans were Spain's
obligation. At the Paris Conference, Spain argued that the doctrine
of state succession meant that those financial obligations passed to
On Public Debts, supra note 32, at 368.
Id. at 359.
36 See ERNST FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 336 (1931)
(analyzing negotiations between Spain and the U.S. regarding debts related to
Cuba post-independence).
37 Ashfaq Khalfan et al., Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 2 (Ctr. For Int'l
Sustainable Dev. Law, Working Paper, 2003).
38 Id.
39 See MOORE, supra note 33, at 352-85 (highlighting the controversial postwar issues as understood at the time).
40 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 25.
34
35
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the United States since the treaty ending the conflict established
U.S. sovereignty over Cuba.41 In particular, Spain demanded
repayment on debt that had been incurred on behalf of Spain, but
had been secured with revenue streams flowing out of Cuba as
42
collateral.
Unsurprisingly, the United States balked at assuming debts
that were personal to Spain.
The response of the Spanish
negotiators turned out to be the impetus for what seems to have
been the first "direct application of a doctrine of odious debts."43
Spain claimed that it would,
be contrary to the most elementary notions of justice and
inconsistent with the dictates of the universal conscience of
mankind for a sovereign to lose all of his rights over a
territory and the inhabitants thereof, and despite this to
continue bound by the obligations he had contracted
exclusively for their regime and government. 44
Spain's argument rested entirely on the traditional rules of
state succession, which simply presumed the assumption of
responsibility for debt without any inquiry into the specific nature
of those liabilities. 45 Spain even defended its position by asserting
the sweeping notion that their argument was consistent with the
"maxims... observed by all cultured nations that are unwilling to
trample upon the eternal principles of justice." 46
By today's standards, a claim invoking "eternal principles of
justice" on behalf of a colonial power is rather comical. Then, of
course, Spain's claim was both serious and typical, which made the

41 See Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1214 (detailing the arguments made by
Spain and America regarding the debt).
42 Id. See generally FEILCHENFELD, supra note 36, at 329-43 (providing a general
survey of U.S.-Spain negotiations in the Cuban controversy). The Spanish
government used the revenue they gained from their Cuban colony to secure

domestic loans. The arrangement allowed Spain to obtain what was essentially
free money.
43 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 25.
44 M. H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections Upon the History of the
International Law of Public Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 ILL. L. REV.
39, 52-53 (1982) (quoting MOORE, supra note 33, at 353, and FEILCHENFELD, supra
note 35, at 336).
45 Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1214.
46 Hoeflich, supra note 44, at 53; Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 26.
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United States' rejoinder all the more striking. The American
negotiators responded by asserting three justifications for their
reluctance to honor the loans. First, the American commissioners
claimed that the loans had not been "contracted for the benefit" of
the Cuban people, but rather they were contrary to Cuba's
interests. 47 Second, they claimed that the burdens of those loans
had been "imposed on Cuba without its consent."48 Finally, and
most importantly for purposes of this Comment, the American
commissioners argued that the creditors knew that the funds were
being used in an effort to "suppress a people struggling for
freedom from Spanish rule." 49 In essence, the United States argued
that when creditors knowingly contracted with debtors who
employed the lent funds for nefarious purposes, they assumed
certain risks. One of the risks was unenforceability,5 0 particularly
when the "loans were 'hostile' to the very people expected to repay
them."51
Negotiations on this specific issue were never actually
resolved. Spain refused to relinquish its position, yet neither the
United States nor Cuba ever repaid the debt.5 2 Still, the U.S.
position, though certainly not understood as a "binding
declaration of law, [should be seen] as... [an early] template for
understanding the doctrine of odious debt, a doctrine with an
53
unsteady history but a compelling rationale."
3.2. Soviet Repudiation of Tsarist Debt
Even early in its development, a valid declaration of
"odiousness" would theoretically not hinge upon the nature of the
succeeding regime. If, for example, an odious regime were to
succeed an odious regime, the successor's "odiousness" in no way
detracts from its abstract legal right to repudiate the illegitimate

Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 26 (emphasis added).
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 Buchheit et al, supra note 12,at 1215.
50 Id. See generally Joseph Hanlon, Defining Illegitimate Debt and Linking Its
Cancellation to Economic Justice, at http://globalfairtrade.ca/Illegitimatedebt.pdf
(last visited January 15, 2007) (defining illegitimate debt by analyzing the basis for
unenforceability).
51 Buchheit et al, supra note 12, at 1215.
52 FEILCHENFELD, supra note 36, at 343.
53 Chander, supra note 33, at 923.
47
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debts of a prior government.5 4 "The character of a successor
regime is irrelevant to a finding that the debt is odious; in such
cases, the [odious] debt still falls with the demise of the prior
regime."5 5 Therefore, when, in 1918, the new Soviet government not necessarily a prime example of a representative governmentannounced that it was going to repudiate the debts of tsarist
Russia, it supported the declaration by citing the burgeoning
odious debt doctrine.5 6 The new Soviet government pointed to the
U.S. repudiation of the Spanish debt and British repudiation of
debts from the Boer War, debts which were incurred by Boer forces
to actually defeat British advances. 57 As in both those earlier
applications of the doctrine, it would be difficult to argue that
tsarist Russia ruled "in the interests of its population." 58
Nevertheless, repudiation was a theoretically legitimate reflection
of the preceding regimes nature. Tsarist Russia's repudiation was
never formally validated, but the obligations were also never
enforced.
3.3. The Tinoco Arbitration
In 1923, the odious debt doctrine was raised once again, this
time in a groundbreaking arbitration decision by U.S. Supreme
Court Chief Justice William Howard Taft that became known as
the Tinoco Arbitration. 59 In 1917, Costa Rican Secretary of War
Federico Tinoco and his brother seized control of their country. 60
Following two years of Tinoco rule, Costa Rican citizens were able
to rid themselves of the dictator and his brother. 61 Before being
removed, however, the Tinocos managed to borrow funds from the
Royal Bank of Canada. Nominally, the money was for Costa
54 See ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR
LEURS DETrES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES [THE EFFECTS OF
STATE

TRANSFORMATIONS

ON

THEIR

PUBLIC

DEBTS

AND

OTHER

FINANCIAL

OBLIGATIONS] 157 (1927) ("Quand m~me un pouvoir despotique serait renversc

par un autre, non moins despotique et ne r~pondant pas davantage A la volontc
du peuple, les dettes 'odieuses' du pouvoir dchu n'en demeurent pas moins des
dettes personnelles et ne son pas obligatoires pour le nouveau pouvoir.").
55 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 27 (citing SACK, supra note 54, at 157).
56 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 27.
57 Id. at 26-27.
58 Id. at 27.
59 Anderson, supra note 25, at 410.
60 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 41.
61 Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1216.
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Rica. 62 In reality, the funds were personal to the Tinocos, and they
served no public purpose. 63 When the successor government came
to power, it immediately passed a law that repudiated the debt
owed to the Royal Bank of Canada based on the reality that the
loans were personal to the Tinocos, even though the funds were
nominally Costa Rica's. 64
Former President and then Chief Justice Taft was appointed as
the sole arbitrator of the ensuing dispute.65 During the arbitration,
Great Britain asserted that international law-essentially referring
to the doctrine of state succession- obligated Costa Rica to repay
loans that had been granted to the prior government. 66 Naturally,
Tinoco's successors disagreed. Costa Rica advanced the argument
that Tinoco was neither the de facto nor the de jure leader of the
state, and therefore lacked the power to bind successor
67
governments.
Chief Justice Taft had a differing view under general principles
of international law. His opinion, noting that a "change of
Government has no effect upon the international obligations of a
State," upheld the doctrine of state succession. 68 Nevertheless, Taft
refused to order Costa Rica to repay the debt owed the bank. He
laid down the principle that funds borrowed by a government
must be for a legitimate government purpose, not for personal use.
Taft wrote:
[t]he transactions in question, which did not constitute
transactions of an ordinary nature and which were "full of
irregularities," [sic] were made at a time when the
popularity of the Tinoco Government had disappeared, and
when the political and military movement aiming at the
overthrow of that Government was gaining strength ....
The case of the Royal Bank depends not on the mere form
of the transaction but upon the good faith of the bank in
62

Id. at 1216-17.

Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 41.
Christoph G. Paulus, "Odious Debts" vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31
BROOK. J.INT'L L. 83, 84-85 (2005-06).
65 Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1216.
66 See id. at 1217 (laying out Great Britain's argument that Costa Rica should
be held responsible for Tinoco's debt)). See generally Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 2
Ann. Dig. 34 (1923) (Taft, Arb.) [hereinafter Tinoco Arbitration].
67 Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1217.
68 Tinoco Arbitration, supra note 66, at 36.
63
64
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payment of money for the real use of the Costa Rican
Government under the Tinoco regime. It must make out its
case of actual furnishing of money to the government for its

legitimate use. It has not done

so.

69

Taft maintained governmental authority to contract for public
debt and to bind its successors, but he also established a legal
precedent that made debt unenforceable if it was not for a valid
70
public purpose.
4.

TOWARDS

A COHERENT THEORY: ALEXANDER SACK

By the mid-1920s, the progression of the odious debt doctrine
was limited to a single legal opinion (the Tinoco Arbitration) and a
handful of nonbinding assertions of its existence and applicability.
In 1927, Alexander Sack, a legal scholar and former Russian
minister, published his famous work that attempted to define this
as yet unnamed exception to the law of state succession. Sack was
attempting to develop a framework with the clarity and coherency
necessary for legal legitimacy and enforceability, while striving to
72
avoid being too limiting. 71 He labeled it "odious debt."
Though he was the nominal father of the odious debt doctrine,
he was also a believer in the well-established principle of state
succession. 73 Sack, like most others, was convinced that the
maintenance and stability of international commerce required
liability for public debts to survive power changing hands.74 Yet
he also firmly believed that "debts not created in the interests of
the state should not be bound [by] this general rule." 75
According to Sack's synthesis of earlier applications, an odious
debt has three fundamental components. First, the borrowing
regime is despotic; second, the funds are not employed in the
general interests of the people of the state; and, finally, the lender
is aware that the expenditures are contrary to the interests of the

69
70

Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 41.
Id. at 41-42.

71 Id. at 17.
72 PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE
THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 (1991) (referring to debts that were

"not created in the interests of the state" as "dettes odieuses").
73 Id.
74 Id.
75

Id.
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people in whose name the debt is incurred. 76 He wrote, "[i]f a
despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of
the State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the
population that fights against it, this debt is odious for the
population of all the State." 77 If these criteria are met, the debt
should become personal to the regime. If the regime were to fall,
78
so too would the debt.
4.1. Absence of Consent
Though Sack was not explicit about the concept of consent,
some scholars argue that his reference to despotic regimes suggests
that he was concerned with a "situation [in which] the people of a
state do not will the transaction to occur." 79 As mentioned
previously, this lack of consent was a critical element of the
American claim in the Tinoco arbitration. It is unclear whether
Sack believed there should be a mechanism for obtaining consent
or whether it should be presumed that despotic regimes always
borrow without consent.8 0 It seems that most scholars believe lack
of consent should be presumed under a despot.8' In reality,
however, such a presumption would dramatically obstruct many
states' ability to acquire necessary funds, an unwanted problem
that will be addressed in a later section.
4.2. Absence of Benefit
The next element, lack of benefit to the state, has two
components. First, the proceeds must be spent contrary to the
76

77

supra note 54, at 127.
ADAMS, supra note 72, at 165 (citing SACK, supra note 54).
SACK,

78 See ADAMS, supra note 72, at 127 (noting that the debt is "personal" to the
regime and would not be attributed to the state).
79 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 15.
80 Oddly, he does not address non-despotic regime, non-consensual
borrowing. Despotism seems to operate as a proxy for lack of consent or,
perhaps, he thinks they are interchangeable. In other words, borrowing without
the consent of the governed is fundamentally indicative of despotism.
81 See generally Anderson, supra note 25, at 418 (noting that many Third World
countries have debts incurred "by undemocratic regimes acting outside the
interests of the people"); Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 118 (equating debts
incurred by a despot with debts incurred without the consent of the population);
Chander, supra note 33, at 927 (calling odious debts, without the consent of the
population, the "fundamental dilemma in international finance"); Jayachandran et
al., supra note 8, at 2 (expressing concern over money lent to dictators who often
lack public consent).
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interests of the state. Second, the debt must actually be contracted
for a purpose in opposition to the interests of the state. In other
words, if a debt were contracted to benefit the state and consented
to, but then spent in a manner that did not benefit the state, the debt
would nevertheless attach to successor regimes.8 2 Here, like the
credit awareness element of his definition, Sack is concerned with
the facilitation of lending. As mentioned previously, he was a
proponent of international commerce, and the supposition here is
straightforward: if creditors begin losing their legal rights over
debt that facially appeared to be proper, they would become less
likely to lend. If creditors were deceived, Sack argued, they should
not have to pay for it. As will be discussed in greater detail, this
overly simplistic economic formulation plays a significant role in
limiting the practical efficacy of Sack's version of the doctrine.
The second prong of Sack's "absence of benefit" test operates
similarly, but in the opposing direction. If a debt is contrary to the
interests of the citizens at the time for which it is contracted, but is
eventually used to benefit the state, the doctrine of odious debt
again will not apply.8 3 Under this prong, Sack evinces his concern
with manipulation of the doctrine and unjust enrichment. He
wants to ensure that an improper debt cannot be converted to a
proper one, while payment is avoided based on the fictitious
original terms. 84 For example, this prong prevents a debtor from
borrowing to purchase chemical weapons, then using the funds to
actually build a hospital to avoid repayment because the
contracting purpose was improper.
4.3. Subjective CreditorAwareness
Beyond all others, it is this prong of Sack's definition that is
misplaced, at least for any modern application of the odious debt
doctrine. According to two scholars on the subject, Sack, along
with other writers, "elevated the primacy of protection of creditors
to the supreme rule."8 5
82 See Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 15-16 (noting that, according to Sack, if
one of the components is not satisfied, the doctrine should not apply because the
lack of resulting benefit to the population alone is insufficient).
83 See id. at 15 (giving the example of South Africa, where funds raised for the
apartheid regime that were later used to benefit the population would not be
considered odious debt).
84 See id. (recognizing that the creditor would be entitled to restitution under
the theory of unjust enrichment, so the odious debt doctrine need not apply).
85 Gtinter Frankenberg & Ralf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness
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For Sack's doctrine to be applicable, the creditors must have a
"subjective awareness" of the odiousness of the loan.8 6
The
practical implications of this requirement are unclear since the
concept has so rarely been invoked. Nonetheless, it must be noted
that in both the Cuban loan case and the Tinoco Arbitration, the
creditors were presumptively aware of the odious application of
87
their loans without a searching evidentiary inquiry.
It is unclear whether or not the presumption in favor of
creditor knowledge existed because both cases were utterly
obvious. What is certain, however, is that proponents of an odious
debt doctrine consistently assert that the subjective awareness of
creditors is a fundamental componentSS It is also a fundamental
error. If subjective awareness is the standard, lenders have a clear
incentive to remain willfully ignorant. Conversely, if persuasive ex
post sanctions existed, creditors would have a new incentive; they
would want to track the application of their loans and to exercise
appropriate diligence.
Contrary to Sack's supposition, this
Comment vigorously argues that modern creditors are the party
best positioned to monitor the use and scope of their funds,
provided they are given certain guidelines from the official sector.
5.

AN APPEALING THEORY, BUT AN UNWORKABLE DOCTRINE

5.1. The Objective
While Sack's writing was a milestone in the intellectual
development of the doctrine, it also proved to be as confusing and
unworkable as it was instructive and original. Under Sack's
formulation, the three elements required to establish that a debt is
actually odious are conjunctive. The debt must be incurred by a
despot and it must not benefit the state and the creditor must be
subjectively aware of these facts. 89 If a democratically elected
regime, for example, contracted a debt for some detestable
purpose, it could not be deemed odious since it was not incurred

of Developing Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12
INT'L J. Soc. L. 415, 427 (1984).
86 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 16.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1218 (describing the determinative

factors in Sack's formulation of odious debt).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 29:4

by a despot.90 Similarly, if an abhorrent regime contracted a debt
for a valid public purpose, but employed the proceeds in a
different, less appropriate manner, the debt could not be
considered odious. 91 Finally, according to Sack, a debt contracted
by a regime hostile to the people of that state would not be deemed
odious if the lender "genuinely believe[d]" that the funds were to
be used for an appropriate purpose. 92 As mentioned previously,
this provision simply encourages lenders to adopt the least
invasive accounting standards possible.
For years, Sack's formulation was unsatisfying for those who
believe that the purpose of the doctrine is to undermine certain
"bad" regimes by cutting off the flow of money. 93 Those scholars
argue that if creditors can so easily avoid the ramifications of a
successful invocation of the doctrine, there is little reason to take it
seriously since capital will continue to flow to the world's worst
regimes. Essentially, the doctrine's strict provisions suggest that it
could never be invoked in the real word.
On the other hand, "[a] traditionalist -a Sackian" would argue
that the doctrine serves a wholly different purpose. The objective
is not to target bad guys, but to "identify objectionable crossborder financial transactions that international law should not
enforce... if the governmental regime in the debtor country
94
changes."
These different interpretations beg critical questions: what is
the objective of the doctrine? Is the goal political, financial, or
moral?
Is it intended to target "bad" regimes or "bad"
transactions? Is it possible to accomplish both while establishing
and maintaining legal legitimacy?
5.2. Economic Suicide?
"Daniel Ortega, leader of the Sandinista government that
succeeded [Anastasio] Somoza, told the United Nations (UN)
General Assembly that his government would repudiate Somoza's
debt, but he reconsidered when his Cuban allies advised him that
90 Id. at 1219.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93 See id. at 1226 (noting this purpose of deterring the flow of funds before it
reaches the regime is "the financial equivalent of what oncologists call starving
the tumor").
94 Id. at 1225.
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doing so would unwisely alienate Nicaragua from Western
capitalist countries." 95 In a theoretical vacuum, the doctrine of
odious debt has great appeal. As evidenced by the above quote,
however, the real world presents significant practical limitations
that hinder the doctrine's efficacy.
Sack's formula and all the historical examples demand a public
repudiation of debt by a successor government. At first glance,
such a requirement may seem both obvious and little more than a
formality. After all, how could a legal determination be made that
a particular debt met the requirements of odiousness unless the
payee brings such a claim? Put another way, if the claimant does
not put forth a claim, there is no case. In reality, this seemingly
straightforward requirement is quite complicated due to the
tendencies of global financial markets. 96 An unreliable debtor is an
unreliable debtor, and states, like individuals, worry about their
"credit score." International law may, in theory, provide a remedy
to nations subject to odious debt, but "the fact remains
that.. .successor governments to illegitimate regimes do not invoke
the odious debt doctrine out of fear that doing so would deprive
them of necessary access to global credit markets." 97
Recent history and common sense suggest that this is a concern
that must be addressed before any workable legal remedy can be
established. Considering that the overwhelming majority of states
impacted by an odious debt doctrine are likely to be less developed
countries ("LDCs"), they are not likely to be in a position to risk
their credit rating. 98 If debt repudiation is viewed by creditors as a
sign of an unreliable debtor, borrowers are unlikely to bring even
legitimate claims. If they repudiate, they will be unable to borrow
because they are considered a "risk." Yet if they pay, their legal
95 Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 12; Koren De Young, Somoza Legacy:
Plundered Economy, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1979, at Al; Terri Shaw, Cuba's Debt
Mistakes: A Lesson for Nicaragua,WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1980, at G1.
96 See generally Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 2-10 (citing rising national
security concerns in weak and failing states, the lack of a stable body of legal rules
to govern the investment cycle, and the complex role of trade sanctions as
complicating factors in the global market).
97

Id. at 2.

98 I know of no instance in which any variation of the odious debt doctrine

has been considered in regards to a developed nation. Perhaps the closest
instance would be the debt consideration of former satellite states of the Soviet
Union. Nonetheless, even though they were not from what is commonly referred
to as the Third World or sometimes the underdeveloped South, these states were
not developed in the sense of their economies or market access.
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claim will essentially evaporate, and they will likely drown under
a mountain of debt. 99
The most recent historical indication of this phenomenon
occurred with the fall of the Soviet Union. Once the central
government was gone, the question of which newly-formed state
would be responsible for which portion of Soviet debt arose
immediately. 100 Creditors and creditor states made it clear to the
former Soviet republics that, "in the interest of any potential
recognition of their independence and future loans and
assistance," they needed to quickly come to an agreement about
how to resolve the financial obligations of the former Soviet
Union1 01 Though some of the remaining Soviet debt could
arguably have met Sack's conception of odious debt, the successor
states agreed to hold a conference to determine their respective
10 2
debt servicing responsibilities.
At the ensuing financial summit, the new states agreed that
they would each be individually liable for their appropriate share
of the debt. 10 3 However, the creditor states "made joint and several
liability a pre-condition to the twelve republics receiving financial
assistance from the Western states," 0 4 thus making each state
individually responsible for the entire debt of the former Soviet
Union. 105 The emerging states shocked nobody when they
succumbed to the pressure and signed a memorandum of
understanding announcing their intention to be jointly and
severally liable for all the remaining debt of the former Soviet
Union. Furthermore, the agreement excluded the Baltic States, a
fact that upset some of the other parties, most notably Ukraine.
99 Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 2-10.
100 See Williams & Harris, supra note 18, at 369 (noting that the meeting of the
former Soviet states to allocate appropriate shares of debt occurred before the
actual dissolution of the Soviet Union).
101 Id.
102
103

Id.
Id.

104 Id.; see also Leyla Boulton, Republics Give Pledge on Soviet Debt, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1991, at 14 ("[R]epublics 'jointly and severally' take responsibility for the
Soviet Union's foreign obligations....").
105 Each state was to be held liable for the entire debt in the event that any of
the other states failed to pay their share. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 354-75 (8th ed. 2004) (defining joint and several
liability as the ability of a plaintiff to extract full payment from any and all
defendants and additionally to receive from secondary defendants any remaining
payments which initial defendants were unable to cover in full).
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When Ukraine balked at the exclusion of the Baltic States, Western
officials stressed that they expected Ukraine to honor the
agreement, warning that if it did not, it "would suffer."106
Irrespective of their frustration, the newly formed nations were, at
least in part, unwilling to risk the wrath of the global capital
markets.
Some commentators, however, disagree with the emphasis on
the reputational element of borrowing.
They argue that
reputational factors are not of primary importance for LDCs, and
therefore, the notion that these states are unwilling to repudiate for
fear of economic suicide is erroneous. The argument asserts that
LDCs, taken as a whole, are too risky to achieve "reputational
'collateral"' in world capital markets even through maintaining
responsible repayment. 07 In other words, lending to these
countries is such an inherently dangerous use of capital, that they
are incapable of improving their credit rating on their own. For an
LDC to be considered a likely candidate for repayment, the
creditor must have certain enforceable legal rights against the
sovereign's assets. Otherwise, they simply cannot generate the
necessary confidence to promote lending.OS Thus, if an LDC is
incapable of forging a good reputation, it has little incentive to
forego debt repudiation as an option because there is nothing to
lose.
This argument is fundamentally flawed. Even if it is accepted
that prompt repayment does not enhance market access for LDCs,
it does not necessarily follow that non-payment or repudiation
leaves an LDC in the same position. In fact, there seems to be a
generally accepted concern that late repayment-and certainly
repudiation- does diminish access to world capital markets.109
"The status quo of the sovereign debt market indeed seems to be
that successor governments, concerned about their reputation,
typically accept responsibility for debt, independent of the nature

106 Leyla Boulton, G7 Threat Crucial in Soviet Debt Agreement, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1991, at 12.
107 Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79
AM. ECON. REV. 43,43 (Mar. 1989).
108 See generally id. at 43-48 (citing analysis indicating the general conditions
under which small countries are unable to establish the requisite reputation for
repayment).
109 See Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 11 (illustrating the reputation
model of borrowing which indicates factors that effect access).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. In t'l L.

[Vol. 29:4

of the preceding regime." 110 Irrespective of the market factors at
play, recent history seems to demonstrate that successor state
concern over access to world capital markets is real. Timely
repayment may not improve a state's standing in the eyes of the
international financial community, but default will certainly
damage it. Therefore, any serious reform proposal must address
the reputational concerns that tend to accompany debt
repudiation.
An odious debt doctrine that limits the financial resources of
regimes that are prone to "bad" transactions, while ensuring that
their successor states can maintain sufficient access to world capital
markets is not an impossibility.
Nevertheless, effectively
reforming the doctrine does require a significant measure of
international political will and in the wake of the Iraq war the
recent surge of interest in the subject suggests that serious reform
proposals currently have a fighting chance and ought to be put
forth immediately.
6.

CONTEMPORARY REBIRTH

& DOCTRINAL NECESSITY

6.1. Iraq
For years, the impracticability of the odious debt doctrine
forced it to languish in the realm of legal scholarship with only an
occasional invocation in an obscure tribunal."' When it has
actually been raised as a legal defense of debt repudiation,
authorities have consistently opted to take a pass on the
question." 2 Yet, as demonstrated by the earlier discussion of the
breakup of the Soviet Union, it has infrequently been invoked.
After the United States' invasion of Iraq, however, the doctrine
assumed a prominent position in post-invasion legal discussions.
In many ways, Hussein's debt was the paradigmatic example of an
odious debt. As noted in the introduction of this Comment, when

110 Id. at 12.
111 See Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1221 n.59 (citing Iran's invocation of
the doctrine of odiousness in the Iran Claims Tribunal).
112 Iran argued before the Iran Claims Tribunal that a particular contract with
the prior regime could not pass to the newly formed Islamic Republic because it
was odious. The Tribunal took a pass, but articulated in dicta its view that the
doctrine was only applicable in instances of state succession, not mere
governmental succession. United States v. Iran, 32 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 162, 175
(1996).
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Hussein came to power in the late 70s, Iraq had some $40 billion in
international reserves and possessed a per capita income of about
$4,000.113 When he was removed twenty-five years later, his
regime was approximately $125 billion in debt." 4 He had spent
lavishly on as many as seventy or eighty palaces, and had
launched a costly eight-year war with Iran." 5 These were not
debts consented to by the Iraqis, nor did they benefit the state. On
the other hand, though substantial, these improper expenditures
did not constitute the entirety of Iraq's $125 billion debt. Of
course, not all of the borrowed money was for an odious purpose.
Largely due to Hussein's well-known personal "odiousness,"
the doctrine underwent a resurgence in the aftermath of the
invasion. A number of commentators called for the debt to be
labeled odious and written off.116 While there is little doubt
regarding Hussein's personal nature, the "odiousness" of the entire
$125 billion is not as clear cut. Nonetheless, the current highprofile of Iraq and its financial situation has given rise to a
renewed, though somewhat incomplete, interest in the subject of
odious debts.17
A Sackian traditionalist would believe that odious debts were
sorted out loan-by-loan and that the objective of the doctrine is to
"identify objectionable cross-border financial transactions that
international law should not enforce... if the governmental
regime in the debtor country changes."" 8 Writing off the entire
debt of a state after a regime change would, therefore, not be an
application of the doctrine originally synthesized and advanced by
Alexander Sack; the post-Iraq notion of "odious debt" is a new,and
imprecise concept. For example, if Hussein employed borrowed
funds to produce chemical weapons that were used on his citizens,
Sack would argue that the debt was odious if the creditor was
aware of the manner in which the funds were used. However, if
Hussein, evil dictator that he was, borrowed a sum to build a road
113 Allawi, supra note 2 ("In the late 1970s when Saddam seized power, Iraq
had about $40 billion in international monetary reserves. By the time he was
deposed in 2003, this had dissolved into more than $125 billion of liabilities.");
Craze, supra note 3 ("In 1980, the average per capita income in Iraq was $4,000.").
114 Allawi, supra note 2.
115 Anderson, supra note 25, at 436.
116 Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1221.
117 See id. at 1221-22 (citing the Iraq debt as a factor which "kindled a
significant resurgence in the literature and debate" surrounding odious debt).
118 Id. at 1225.
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between, say, Tikrit and Baghdad, Sack would not have considered
it odious. On the other hand, post-Iraq odious debt theories tend
to argue that it was all odious because the funds were borrowed by
Hussein-an odious ruler.119 Hussein's debt is easily painted with
this broad brush: "because Hussein's debts are odious, they are
not the responsibility of the Iraqi people, but instead the debts of
Hussein's regime." 120 There is no real legal foundation upon which
this notion can be advanced, but it has gained currency in light of
the situation and the fact that so much of Hussein's debts were
incurred in the violent suppression of his own people. 121 This
reality creates a desire to craft a doctrine that streamlines the
ambiguities and shades of gray in Sack's definition. Such a
formulation is certainly appealing in its simplicity, but is it
realistic?
While an uncomplicated rule can be helpful in lifting a
tremendous burden off the backs of the Iraqi people, such an
imprecise and sweeping proposal, if implemented, would wreak
havoc in financial markets around the world. If a debt is to be
deemed odious based on the leader of the borrowing country,
lenders must know who the bad guys are, but the nature of the
regime in question is not always as clear as Hussein's Iraq. Who
would get to make such supercharged political decisions as
deciding who was "bad" and who was "not that bad?"
Furthermore, what happens to debt incurred by other deposed,
but similarly malevolent, dictators far away from the lights of
CNN? The debts of countless other regimes would be repudiated
immediately. If Hussein's debts were all written off simply
because he was a "bad guy," many other nations of the world that
have suffered under the heel of an oppressive ruler would have an
equally valid claim for debt forgiveness.
For instance, in Zaire, Mobuto's $12.9 billion debt would be
repudiated without the rigorous analysis needed to determine how
the proceeds from each loan were actually employed. 122 Like
Hussein's, Mobutu's personal expenditures were enormous: he
119 See id. at 1222 (finding that recent commentators are more willing to
assume that all odious regimes behave odiously at all times and therefore that all
incurred debts are odious).
120 Anderson, supra note 25, at 437.
121 See id. (acknowledging that the odious debt doctrine is rarely applied
directly, yet citing Yugoslavia as an example where experts interpret the twothirds reduction in debt as a utilization of the principle of odious debts).
122 Id. at 413.
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built massive estates abroad and he stole billions of dollars from
his country's treasury. 123 But a complete ex post repudiation could
certainly present a problem of unjust enrichment. Like Hussein, it
is unrealistic to assume that none of Mobuto's debt was incurred
and spent on behalf of the public. Although he decimated his
population for decades, it does not logically follow that surviving
generations should automatically be free from repaying all loans
incurred during his reign.
Finally, there is another logical flaw in Sack's doctrine that
must be addressed for any reform to be effective. Sack's version
creates a significant loophole wherein a dictator could borrow
funds to cover legitimate state needs, thereby freeing up other
sources of money to fund gross military expenditures or the like.
Doing so would be a fairly simple, and protected, sleight-of-hand
trick. It may be impossible to completely eliminate this problem,
but it is important to recognize its existence.
6.2. Third World Debt Crisis
While Iraq's unique situation began the revival surrounding
the odious debt doctrine, Hussein's debts are not the only
contemporary issue that has sparked appealing, but inaccurate,
support for the doctrine.
It is simply a fact that much of what is becoming known as the
"Global South" suffers from a "destructive cycle of debt" that
demands serious attention from the developed world. 124 This
external debt harms countries in two ways. It diverts resources
"that could otherwise be used for public services and poverty
eradication.., and indeed, this diversion alone should be grounds
for cancellation of debt in deeply impoverished countries ....But
probably more important is the inextricable link between debt and
countries' vulnerability to the demands of multilateral
creditors."125
In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that failed
states are both a moral quandary and a national security hazard.
The United States and other developed nations have a great deal of
work to do on the matter, but even self-interested recognition of

123
124
125

Id. at 436.
Ambrose, supra note 10, at 267.
Id. at 270-71.
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the crisis surrounding failed states is a start. 126 Nonetheless, any
attempt to categorize stifling sovereign debts as doctrinally odious
is misguided.
Unfortunately, neither overwhelming debt nor wide agreement
about the nature of dictatorships has the requisite precision to
serve as an international legal standard upon which to rest a
modem formulation of the odious debt doctrine. It is entirely
plausible that the international community may want to forgive
debts incurred by dictators like Hussein or to relieve the massive
debt overhang afflicting so many developing nations, but it cannot
be done effectively if the approach is ad hoc and too freewheeling.
Paradoxically, the results of such a standard-less but benevolent
approach could be devastating for the developing world's access to
capital. The risk of lending to LDCs would be too great. Either
loan requests would be outright denied or exorbitant risk
premiums would be charged. Either way, a policy that lacks some
ex ante clarity for lenders would be damaging to countries in need
of capital.
7.

TOWARDS AN IMPROVED DOCTRINE

In this section, I outline a proposal that incorporates and
expands upon some other recent suggestions for the reformation of
the odious debt doctrine. My analysis operates on the assumption
that the right to repudiate illegitimate debts exists within
international law, but the challenge of establishing sufficient proof,
and concerns regarding future access to credit, make it highly
improbable that a burdened state will attempt to exercise its right
of repudiation.
One of the hallmarks of this proposal involves a shift in the
burden of proof from the borrower to the lender when a prior
regime has been labeled as "odious-prone." 127 Shifting of the
burden, coupled with proper enforcement, will push creditors
towards self-policing, a responsibility they are well positioned to
execute. While my proposal is not the first to advocate shifting the
126 The National Security Strategy, supra note 11, FORWARD (noting that
poverty, weak institutions, and corruption make "weak states" vulnerable to the
operation of terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders and thus
make them a danger to the national security interests of "strong states").
127 See generally Jayachandran et al., supra note 8 (advocating for an
alternative reform program for odious debt that gives lenders the responsibility to
cite specific legitimate ends for the funds and the due diligence monitoring plan
they will implement to ensure the funds are indeed used for such purposes).
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burden onto the backs of creditors, it does propose specific
mechanisms for doing so that are, I believe, unique.
My formulation of the odious debt doctrine would also, in part,
"serve as a preventative measure in that it is [sic] would induce
creditors, in the future, to be less cooperative in their dealings with
dictators." 128 Under the logic of the current doctrine, creditors
actually have an incentive to learn as little as possible about how
their funds are deployed. That must change.
Additionally, as discussed earlier, nations that would be
inclined to repudiate debt as odious frequently opt not to take such
measures due to fear of retribution. For that reason, another
prominent feature of any serious reform proposal must include a
mechanism that will guarantee continued access to the world's
capital markets for any debtor nation that attempts to repudiate its
debt.
7.1. Target: Creditors
Alexander Sack published his landmark treatise in 1927. It was
not the first articulation of the doctrine, but he did synthesize the
129
earlier applications in an attempt to craft a coherent definition.
One of the important features of Sack's formulation, and of
conventional wisdom at the time, was that any exception to the
doctrine of state succession should be primarily concerned with the
protection of creditors; hence, a third prong of the definition is
subjective creditor awareness1 30
In that era, after World War I and shortly before the
Depression, ensuring flows of capital was paramount, and the
creditors held all the cards. In fact, "[f]or nearly two centuries, the
official sector has tried to distance itself from direct responsibility
for the fate of private sector lenders to sovereign debtors." 131 The

128 Jtrgen Kaiser & Antje Queck, Odious Debts-Odious Creditors? International
Claims on Iraq, Dialogue on Globalization, Occasional Paper No. 12, at 23,
(FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, 2004), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/
odiousdebts/publications/iraqpaper.pdf.
129 Buchheit et al, supra note 12, at 1218 (summarizing Sack's formulation of
odious debt as a debt that is "contracted by a despotic power for a purpose that is
not in the general interests or needs of the state, and the lender knows that the
proceeds of the debt will not benefit the nation as a whole") (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
130 Khalfan et al., supra note 37, at 15-16 (pointing out that Sack most
vigorously propounded the requirement of subjective awareness of creditors).
131 Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6
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Sackian view was that the creditors who were aware of the nature
of these expenditures had "committed a hostile act with regard to
the people," but the burden to prove that awareness was on the
borrower. 132 Attempting to meet that burden, of course, required
repudiating the debt and risking access to borrowing. Even if a
debtor nation could meet the burden, conventional wisdom
suggested they would be denied resources, and certainly lending
would be denied if they failed to meet the burden. Even if
borrowers won, they still lost, and if they lost, well, they clearly
lost.
Today, increasingly integrated world markets make such a
relatively laissez-faire attitude towards creditors dangerous, and if
an effective odious debt doctrine is actually to be crafted, it is a
completely untenable approach. Beyond the financial concern of
systemic contagion which accompanies market integration, there
are national security implications surrounding failed states that
resonate at the highest levels of government. 133 Now, "the official
sector [views] a sovereign debt problem in one country as a
potential source of disruption elsewhere. The financial and
geopolitical consequences of an unmanageable debt crisis can no
longer be neatly contained in a single country, or even a single
region." 134 Granted, the instances of so-called odious debt are only
one element of a larger problem, but the increasing necessity of
official sector involvement in the sovereign debt crisis has created
an opportunity to formulate an odious debt doctrine with teeth-a
doctrine that limits the free reign previously enjoyed by creditors.
Today, the quantity of debt passing between private lenders
and sovereign borrowers is staggering. As mentioned earlier,
when Saddam Hussein's government was toppled, it was $125
billion in debt. 135 Under a Sackian view of the doctrine, each
individual loan that contributed to that $125 billion overhang must
be parsed and analyzed to determine its specific use. And then,
the borrower would have to prove that each creditor was aware of
the nefarious application of each of its loans. Since Hussein was

CHIJ. INT'L L. 333, 342 (2005).
132 ADAMS, supra note 72, at 165.
133

The National Security Strategy, supranote 11, FORWARD.

134 Buchheit, supra note 131, at 334.
135 See Allawi, supra note 2 (noting that Iraq's national debt under Hussein
rose from $40 billion to over $125 billion).
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clearly a despot, a lack of consent is presumed. 36 But which loans
were used on roads and which were for weapons? What about the
loans that were divided; say one-third was used to construct a
hospital and two-thirds were used on a lavish palace for Saddam?
Again, should bean counters be tasked with combing through
records in an effort to determine the amount of debt used to
"benefit" the people as opposed to the quantity that was personal
to Hussein's regime?
Yes, this regime, if instituted, does not make evasion
impossible. A dictator of Saddam's ilk would simply purchase all
his weapons with cash from oil revenues, and he would borrow to
support any social welfare initiatives. Here, Hussein is not actually
the paradigmatic example. Iraq's oil revenue makes this scenario
more plausible than it would be for other, similarly situated
dictators. Many of the states that would be tagged with an odious
label lack significant resources outside of borrowing. Instituting
this regime would not eliminate all bad actors, nor would it
eliminate all bad expenditures, but any doctrine that makes it
harder for bad guys to borrow, and makes sure that when they do,
the funds are devoted to social welfare, is certainly going to be a
positive development.
Putting aside the obvious definitional problems with this
conception of odious debt, the practical limitations are clear. The
sheer manpower it would take to exhaustively examine so many
records is staggering. Moreover, it seems unlikely that dictators of
Hussein's ilk put great emphasis on their financial record keeping.
The only way a doctrine of odious debt will ever work is if the
burden is shifted from the borrower to the much stronger
shoulders of the creditor. The lender, after all, is the party best
positioned to monitor its internal decision making and the use of
its funds. 137 The creditor can simply attach stipulations to its loan
136 See generally Anderson, supra note 25, at 439 (noting that Iraq's dealings
with odious debt would have consequences for other countries with loans made
by authoritarian regimes); Chander, supra note 33, at 927 (discussing the dilemma
in odious debt of not saddling a population with repayment of a loan to which it
did not consent); Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the specific
problem of when dictators borrow money and put it toward illegitimate
purposes).
137 The tools of private lenders in international finance allow them to monitor
and police their funds better than anyone else. Additionally, borrowers have an
obvious incentive to comply with lenders when they request certain information.
If such requests are not honored, the creditor can easily cease lending, and they
would if continuing meant risking their legal rights. Chander, supra note 33, at
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agreements demanding the ability to audit.
States that are
legitimately in need of funds are not going to balk at such a
requirement.
Under the classical model of the odious debt doctrine, creditors
stand to lose their legal right of enforcement only if it is proven
that they are subjectively aware of the funds' intended use. 138 Such
a requirement naturally creates incentives for lenders to employ
the lowest level of due diligence possible. 139 Creditors will go out
of their way not to know how their funds are going to be spent in
order to maintain their right of repayment. On the other hand, a
properly crafted policy that shifts the burden of proof to the
creditor and uses an objective measurement to determine creditor
awareness would do precisely the opposite: create an incentive for
extreme diligence.
A creditor could guarantee its right of
repayment by being able to demonstrate its meticulous attention to
the uses of its money. Such a shift would depress, but not
eliminate, the flow of capital to regimes prone to odious
expenditures. Slowing the train of capital to bad regimes is not
necessarily a bad thing. Of course, funds used for odious purposes
are still going to trickle into the coffers of dictators, but it would
become more difficult to use loans in such a manner if the
commercial creditor is constantly monitoring the allocation of
borrowed resources.
Nevertheless, exceptional "care must be exercised to develop
arrangements which strike an appropriate balance between
realizing the benefits of a more logical approach towards the
resolution of odious debts and the corresponding potential for a
chilling impact on legitimate sovereign borrowing."'140 If the new
rules are vague, the risk premium for lending to developing
nations will be too high. Slowing the stream of money pouring
into the treasuries of these regimes is probably helpful, but
preventing it entirely is perhaps even more likely to curtail
development and create failed states than the unworkable odious
926 (stating that "certain players in international finance are more likely to have
knowledge of the uses of the borrowed funds than others").
138 See Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 21 (arguing that the due diligence
model would involve a higher bar of due diligence for lenders than the classical
model's subjective knowledge standard of "willful and reckless failure to make
inquiries").
139 See id. (asserting that any modicum of diligence would satisfy the "willful
and reckless failure" standard).
140 Id. at 15.
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debt doctrine we have been stuck with for more than a century.
If balancing these concerns is truly the key, it becomes critically
important to make sure that creditors are aware of the rules of the
game. In an effort to give lenders a clear picture of the playing
field, Seema Jayachandran, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan Shafter
developed an idea to create an organization with the express
purpose of "determin[ing] ex ante that specified nations are prone
to odious debt." 141 They propose an international organization that
is constantly monitoring regimes around the world and, when
appropriate, has the authority to label certain regimes "odiousprone." 142 Much of their work is immensely helpful, and the
notion of ex ante labeling is critical, but the second major element
of their proposal, which would endow that same organization with
a costly monitoring function, limits its viability. Still, their work,
particularly the formation of an organization that labels regimes,
has been integral to the development of my proposal.
Labeling a regime as "odious prone" ex ante- that is relative to
collapse, not to lending-is possible and necessary.
The
multilateral organization would establish a set of criteria to
determine "odiousness," and once a determination that the label
should be affixed to a state has taken place, lenders would be
officially on notice. Any funds lent to that state demand an
extreme level of scrutiny. Any loans that were dispersed prior to
the designation would not be subject to these rules. If the regime
were to fall, the succeeding government would be responsible for
debts incurred prior to the labeling. In addition, Jayachandran et
al. propose granting the organization a monitoring function as
well. My proposal adopts their labeling function, but rejects the
monitoring function in favor of a judicial role that would only be
invoked when a regime falls and the successor government brings
a claim. 143
Under this proposal, once a regime is labeled as "odiousprone," loans can still be granted, but they require extreme
diligence by the creditor. If the "odious-prone" regime falls, the
successor then has a judicial venue before which it can bring an
odious debt claim. If a matter progresses to this point, any lender
whose debt has been repudiated has the burden of proving that
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21 n.28.
143 See id. at 19-22 (arguing that "[a]n organization should be enlisted or
designed to determine ex ante that specified nations are prone to odious debt").
141

142
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they exercised extreme diligence across the life of the loan. In other
words, a creditor may choose to lend without exercising diligence
in hopes that the regime continues on in perpetuity, or it can
exercise the requisite diligence and maintain their claim
irrespective of the fate of the odious regime. Of course, the
corollary to this is that a creditor must cease lending and demand
repayment if the diligence discovers improper expenditures.
7.2. The Least-Cost Avoider and Legitimate Lending
After the label is affixed to a regime, all lenders would be
considered on notice; they contracted with eyes wide open. Not
only would these lenders possess the best information about their
borrowers, they are also in the best position to demand a constant
stream of data regarding how their money is being spent. "[Blanks
[have] branches or representative offices in the debtor countries
and they [are] thus in a position to assess firsthand the local
political and economic scene." 144 If the creditor cannot prove it
constantly met the exacting standard of extreme diligence, the loan
will be considered
presumptively odious, the creditor
presumptively knowledgeable, and the loan will be written off.
The legal rights of the lender, in regards to a specific loan, will be
extinguished.
Once again, there is a concern that legitimate lending to the
developing world will be depressed if an aggressive odious debt
regime is implemented. 145 As Jayachandran et al. point out, "[a]
private bank would think twice before lending to a regime if the
world's leading powers, international organizations, and financial
institutions had declared that the regime lacked public consent and
announced that they would consider successor governments
justified in [attempting to] repudiat[e] any new loans the odious
regime incurs." 146 This quotation, offered as a defense of the
proposal, is actually indicative of a major problem which
surrounds any proposal that seriously burdens creditors.
Establishing an organization with labeling authority, however, is
144 Chander, supra note 33, at 926 (quoting Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-Border
Lending: What's Different This Time?, 16 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 44, 48 (1995)).
145 See generally id. (discussing the balance between holding bondholders
accountable for irresponsible lending and ensuring the flow of capital to the
developing world); Buchheit et al., supra note 12 (arguing for a less dramatic
approach than the odious debt doctrine).
146 Jayachandran et al., supra note 8, at 5.
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unlikely to drastically cut off lending to most developing nations
since it will only impact those saddled with the odious label. 147 In
fact, it will signal to the international financial community which
developing nations are a safer bet.
The regime, however, will depress lending to odious-prone
states, and potentially, it will have the added benefit of making it
more difficult for such despots, now plausibly strapped for cash, to
maintain their power. Admittedly, it will also make legitimate
borrowing by odious-prone regimes more difficult and expensive,
but will not eliminate it. In fact, given demand in the sovereign
debt market, it seems likely that this new regime could give rise to
a new kind of bank: banks with highly sophisticated monitoring
capabilities that specialize in lending to odious-prone regimes.
7.3. CapitalMarket Access
The success of this proposal rests almost entirely on the ability
of governments, newly emerged from under the heel of an odiousprone regime, to safely bring a claim. Win or lose, these new states
must be confident in their ability to access the capital markets.
Without this safeguard, the argument is merely academic. Though
any such body must be considered broadly legitimate, it need not
be part of a truly global organization.
The governments
participating in it simply must control enough of the world's credit
to guarantee any sovereign that brings a claim continued access to
significant quantities of capital. If a sovereign is confident that its
access to credit will not vanish in the wake of attempted debt
repudiation, claims will not disappear under a fear of reprisal.
Jayachandran et al. suggest a few different bodies for
implementation of this proposed organization.
Among the
possibilities, they mention the G8. The G8, meeting annually since
1975, was designed to serve as a forum for the leading
industrialized nations to address issues relevant to the everchanging world economy. 48 Addressing the "dilemma of odious
debt"' 49 falls precisely in line with their mission. Furthermore, the
G8 actually controls enough of the world's capital to effectively
create this kind of institution. The member nations of the Group of
Eight represent 49% of world exports and 51% of global industrial

147

Id.

148

G8 Information Center, supra note 14.

149 See Buchheit et al., supra note 12, at 1201.
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output.150 If the eight member countries adopt this proposal,
newly emerged governments could assert an odious debt claim
confident that the vast capital markets of the G8 nations would
remain open to them, irrespective of the outcome of their claim.
Creating an organization staffed with economists and political
scientists tasked with labeling and, when an odious-prone regime
collapses, with lawyers and judges, would not be a massive
financial or bureaucratic burden. In fact, this is one of the major
improvements of this proposal over the Jayachandran plan, which
envisioned the labeling organization as also maintaining a
cumbersome and costly monitoring capacity. Private lenders,
however, are better positioned to monitor themselves, and they
151
will do so if appropriate legal rules are created and enforced.
Additionally, the institutional commitment required to closely
examine all loans to odious prone regimes would be extreme. The
G8 is simply not going to make that kind of commitment.
On the other hand, an organization tasked merely with the
labeling function and with the role of adjudicating claims that arise
after an odious regime has fallen and after the successor regime
opts to bring an odious debt claim, demands a much less
significant, and more realistic commitment. This judicial function
is not necessarily simple or inexpensive, but the instances of a
labeled regime falling, and of the successor opting to bring a claim,
would likely be very few. The judicial function would rarely be
needed, and it would therefore require significantly fewer
resources. Yet, the infrequent necessity of the judicial mechanism
would make establishing a comprehensive body of precedents
difficult. There is, however, a pre-existing body of law that bears
some factual similarities to the jurisprudence that the new
organization would require: Delaware corporate law.
7.4. Delaware CorporateLaw: A Model For A New Regime
Perhaps the most enduring problem plaguing the various
theories supporting the doctrine involves its practicality. Earlier
reform proposals have tended to require either a costly
international oversight regime, which is unlikely to ever be
implemented, or an ex post loan-by-loan analysis in nations that do
150 G8
Finance
Minister
Meetings,
http://www.g8finance.ru/en/
information/history (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
151 Chander, supra note 33, at 926 (arguing that such lenders are positioned to
assess firsthand the local political and economic scene).
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not typically have the most sophisticated financial record keeping
policies. A loan-by-loan system of inquiry would also be cost
prohibitive.
My proposed organization, however, could be
maintained on a relatively spare budget, except in the uncommon
instances when a regime falls and the successor repudiates the
debt.
This proposed judicial function exposes a plausible, and
familiar, critique: it is too costly to be realistic. Establishing a
tribunal is a significant undertaking, but there is an appropriate
jurisprudential model that, if applied, would greatly reduce the
"start-up" costs involved in the establishment of this new body: the
Delaware corporate law entire fairness doctrine. 5 2
American corporate law has developed this standard to
address the problems inherent in self-interested transactions.
Delaware has established the rule that "the controlling or
dominating shareholder proponent of the transaction bears the
burden of proving its entire fairness." 153 In other words, when a
controlling shareholder or a self-interested board of directors
concludes a transaction, they face the burden of demonstrating
both fair dealing and fair terms. 5 4 The burden I propose to place
on creditors that lend to "odious-prone" regimes is exceedingly
similar.
Underlying this standard is the supposition that corporations
are best positioned to monitor their own activities. 55 The entire
fairness standard has not brought an end to controlling
shareholder or board-driven transactions. To the contrary, it has
caused boards to establish independent committees to carefully
review the terms of deals, lest the courts intervene. The controlling
party has the responsibility of ensuring and demonstrating that the
underlying transaction was fair.
Application of a similar standard in the odious debt sphere
makes a great deal of sense, and the logic of my proposal mirrors
that underlying the entire fairness standard. Like the entire
152 See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (finding
that where one stands on both sides of a merger, he/she has the burden of
showing the entire fairness of the transaction).
153 Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (citing
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710-11).
154 Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115 (quoting Wiengerger, 457 A.2d at 710) ("The concept
of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.").
155 See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (discussing independent directors' approval
creating a presumption of fairness).
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fairness doctrine, it would demand that the party best positioned
to monitor a transaction scrutinize it very closely. Establishing
divisions or departments specifically designated to lend to and
monitor regimes labeled odious-prone, much like the corporate
special committees, is one possible product of instituting my
proposal. As a result of Delaware's law, establishing these
committees has become common practice. Likewise, creditorestablished odious lending departments are likely to become the
norm since their efforts will be essential to maintenance of the
debtor's obligation.
Lending to these regimes will still be
profitable, and creditors will have an incentive to continue
contracting with them. They will also have an incentive to do so
with caution, and developing expertise is an efficient way of
achieving these two goals. These newly formed departments will
demand more detailed auditing than ever before, and they will be
well-positioned to lift the veil and see behind the scenes of these
regimes.
Creditors will require highly convincing evidence
regarding the use of their funds since, if the borrowing regime
falls, they will face the loss of their claim. Of course, if the creditor
cannot conclusively prove to the tribunal appropriate diligence of
their loans ex post, they will not be able to satisfy the burden of
"entire fairness."
Though the analogy to Delaware corporate law is imperfect,
and a more significant analysis of the relevant jurisprudence is
needed to determine the extent to which the analogy is useful, the
logical parallels, however limited, are instructive.
8.

CONCLUSION

The reality of a Sackian definition of odious debt is that it only
targets "loans to corrupt dictators who, with the lenders' knowledge,
used the proceeds for their own private enrichment, and loans
whose proceeds were employed to suppress rebellious subjects." 15 6
This version is rife with obvious and significant problems.
Namely, creditors will work to lend blindly.
If,
on the other hand, as some theorists would like, the doctrine
is modified to target bad regimes generally, it immediately
becomes an impractical academic exercise stuck in definitional
quicksand. Who gets to define which regimes are sufficiently bad?
Is it a political tool or an economic one? Should the doctrine be
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crafted to inhibit general lending to bad guys? In short, the
doctrine would become little more than an economic sanction
employed against the enemies of the powerful.
These concerns demonstrate that one of the significant
problems plaguing the evolution of a workable doctrine has been
the convoluted objective. Clearly, formulating a feasible policy has
proved daunting, but the necessity of devising clear principles on
the matter remains important, and it demands concentrated
attention. Admittedly, my proposed solution could conceivably
allow bad actors to essentially launder money. They could use
borrowed funds properly, thereby freeing other revenue streams
for inappropriate uses. This is a real issue that survives my
proposal, and it is a legitimate and likely critique, but it is not
prescriptive. In other words, while this is an imperfect solution, it
is a helpful and plausible one. It will not put all dictators out of
business, but it may make it harder for them to finance their
reprehensible agendas, and it may allow a succeeding regime an
opportunity to relieve some of its debt burden.
My proposal attempts to strike a balance between the
competing concerns of political practicality, capital flows, and
burden imposition on creditors. It assumes that alternatives could
exist in which creditors continue to lend to the developing world,
but intensely monitor the use of their capital. Above all else, I have
tried to formulate a proposal that creates incentives for extreme
diligence by creditors, but I have tried to remain cognizant of the
necessary equilibrium between the benefits of a more logical
doctrine and its potential for disturbing legitimate sovereign
lending.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

